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Both the County and the Highway District have relinquished all claims and 
defenses raised below, except for the claim that there was a common law dedication of 
the right-of-way through the Paddison property. 
As to the common law dedication issue, historically, there are two kinds of a 
dedication in Idaho, statutory and common law. Both require acceptance of the 
dedication: statutory dedication requires following certain statutory procedures; common 
law dedication requires something short of the statutory formalities for acceptance but 
still requires an unequivocal act by proper public officials to assume jurisdiction over the 
property dedicated. Such unequivocal act includes annexation, a resolution, or 
maintenance by the county or highway district. 
In this case, no such act has ever occurred and instead, both the County and the 
Highway District both refuse jurisdiction over the road and deny an interest in it. 
III. ll\llPORTANT FACTS. 
The Right-of-Way Deed was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture for Fifty 
Dollars ($50.00). (R., 22-25. 27-30, 34). The right-of-way is part of what is referred to 
as Forest Road 317. (R., R., 4, 62). The Forest Service is the only entity that has ever 
done any maintenance on the road. (R., 104, 130, 183). 1 The Forest Service controls 
access to the road by a gate which is closed for seven to nine months per year. (R., 130, 
147). The Paddisons have their own gate at the same location and have been told by the 
Forest Service that they can close it, and Richard Paddison does so at his discretion. (Id.) 
1 The sporadic maintenance alleged to have been done by the Forest Service is set forth in Appellant's Brief 
at p. 5. 
[ l] 
Based on the evidence presented by Terry Agee of the Highway District, public 
use of the right-of-way didn't begin until about 30 years ago, which would be 1980. (R., 
103, 104). Prior to then, virtually the only use of the right-of-way was via horse by the 
person staffing the fire lookout. (R., 130-131). In about 2000, the use of the road by 
A TVs increased dramatically. (Id.) 
Both the County and the Highway District disclaim jurisdiction over the right-of-
way. (Highway District's Brief, p. 4, 1. 10; County's Brief, p. 3, 1. 7 and 1. 14.) Both the 
County and the Highway District consider the Coolwater Ridge Road, of which the right-
of-way is a part, to be a Forest Service road. (R., 104 at <f[8; County's Brief, p. 3, 1. 15). 
The Highway District states that it has no interest in it. (R., 87, 104). It has no record 
accepting the dedication of the right-of-way. (R., 87, 104, 150) It has not laid out, 
altered, or opened the right-of-way as a highway. (Id.) The District has never included 
the right-of-way on its official map. (Id.) It has never performed work, construction, 
maintenance or repair of the right-of-way or kept it up at its expense. (Id.) 
All of the preceding has been admitted by the County as well. (R., 12. 13, 15, 62, 
63, 83). 
In short, both the Highway District and the County admit that there has been no 
"positive conduct" or any unequivocal act by either entity to accept the dedication and 
assume jurisdiction over the right-of-way. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE HIGHWAY DISTRICT Acl\1D COUNTY ARE ARGUING FOR A 
TYPE OF PUBLIC ROAD THAT DOES NOT EXIST UNDER IDAHO 
LAW. 
[2] 
Before discussing all the case law cited by the Highway District, the Court should 
focus on what government body, if any, would assume jurisdiction of the right-of-way. 
The Highway District argues that: "[t]he offer of common law dedication may be 
accepted by individual members of the public rather than a specific local road agency." 
Highway District Brief: p. 15. There is no case law supporting this proposition. 
For a common law dedication to be valid, some public agency must accept the 
dedication. Contrary to the Highway District's assertion, Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 
Idaho 205, 998 P.2d 1118 (2000), is very applicable to this case and did involve a claim 
of common law dedication. The Court held that because the Minidoka Highway District 
refused to assume jurisdiction over the road, a public road was not created. Id. 134 Idaho 
at 208. 
In 1978, Klosterman had platted subdivision lots, recorded the plat, and sold the 
subdivided lots with reference to the plat. However, the Minidoka County Highway 
District would not endorse its acceptance on the plat and would not assume responsibility 
for the roads depicted on the plat. Therefore, the case did not involve a statutory 
dedication because the plat did not meet the requirements for a statutory dedication. 
Instead, relying on Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club, 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 
111 ( 1989), Klosterman argued that a valid common law dedication was effected when he 
platted the lots and sold them based on the plat. His argument was that he had dedicated 
the road, sold the lots, and the facts were that he and the owners in the subdivision used 
the road. The Court rejected Klosterman's argument that a common law dedication was 
effected. 
[3] 
In doing so, the Court distinguished Klosterman' s case from Worley because in 
Worley: 
The highway district was asserting a claim to the roadway which would 
require maintenance of the roadway at public expense. In this case the 
Minidoka Highway District does not claim any interest in the roadways. 
and the litigants agree there is no public responsibility for maintenance of 
the roads. 
Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho at 208. 
In this case, just like in Stafford, both the Highway District and the County have 
disclaimed any interest in and refused responsibility for the right-of-way. 
The Stafford Court also questioned the continuing viability of common law 
dedication and put to rest the possibility that there can be a common law dedication 
without some act which unequivocally shows an intent to assume jurisdiction over the 
property dedicated. Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct.App. 1982). 
The Stafford Court stated: 
Even if the cases related to dedication by the common law method have 
continuing viability, they do not aid Klosterman, because he does not 
claim Peck Road or the sixty-foot easement to be public roads as that 
concept is recognized in Idaho law. He claims a form of public road 
casement which involves no public responsibility. 
Id. 134 Idaho at 208. (Emphasis added). 
Likewise, in this case, neither the County nor the Highway District want 
jurisdiction over, responsibility for, or maintenance of the road, yet they both argue that 
this Court should mle it is a public road under the laws of the state of Idaho. Like the 
plaintiff in Stafford, both entities are arguing for a form of public road under Idaho law 
which does not exist. 
[4] 
This Court should rule that given the refusal of the County and the Highway 
District to claim an interest in or assume jurisdiction over the road in this case, it is not a 
public road under the laws of the state of Idaho, whether by common law dedication or 
otherwise. 
Otherwise, a mling in favor of the Highway District or the County would allow a 
property owner to dedicate a road by deed. allow people to use the road. and thereby 
create a public road even in the presence of the refusal by a county or city or highway 
district to claim any interest or assume jurisdiction over the road. This is not a means by 
which a public road can be created in Idaho. 
B. THE FACTS OF THE CASES CITED BY THE HIGH\VA Y DISTRICT 
AND COUNTY ALL INVOLVE EITHER THE SALE OF LOTS \VITH 
REFERENCE TO A RECORDED PLAT OR SOl\tIE ACTION \VHICH 
UNEQUIVOCALLY SHO\VED THE INTENT TO ASSUME 
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPERTY DEDICATED. 
To prove a common law dedication in Idaho, one must prove that the dedication 
was accepted by "positive conduct evincing consent of proper public officers on behalf of 
the public. Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86, 88 (Ct.App. 1982.) The 
dedication is complete when there is some act which unequivocally shows an intent to 
assume jurisdiction over the property dedicated. Id. Annexation has been held to be one 
such unequivocal act. Id. 103 Idaho at 884, 655 P.2d 91; Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 
26 Idaho 505, 510, 144 P. 548 (1914). 
The Highway District cites to cases it claims proves a common law dedication 
was completed in this case.2 However, not one of the cases stands for the argument made 
by the Highway District. Every case cited involved either the platting of property into 
2 The County only cites Thiessen and does not cite any other cases. Instead, it simply concurs in the 
Highway District's arguments. 
[5] 
lots and the sale of the lots with respect thereto, or some other positive act showing 
acceptance and assumption of jurisdiction by the particular city, county, or highway 
district over the road. 
The first case cited is Boise City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 94 P. 167 (1908). 
However, that case involves the discrete aspect of common law dedication that applies 
where property has been subdivided into lots, the plat lays out roads and streets, and the 
lots have been thereafter sold. In such case, the dedication is complete upon the sale of 
lots. See e.g., Saddlehorn Ranch Landowner's v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677 
(2009); Ponderosa Homesite v. Garfield, 143 Idaho 407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006); Armand v. 
Opportunity Afanagement Co., Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 117 P.3d 123 (2005); West Wood 
Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 106 P.3d 401 (2005). 
No such facts exist in this case. 
r-.foreover, in Boise City v. Hon, after the subdivision was platted, it was annexed 
by the Boise City, which the Court held was "implied acceptance" on the part of the city. 
In response to the contention that there had been no acceptance by the city, the Court 
stated: 
Prior to 1893, we had no statute on the subject of laying out city and 
village lots and blocks, streets and alleys, filing plats thereof, and 
dedicating streets and alleys to public use. It is the contention of counsel 
for respondent that there was no acceptance of this dedication by Boise 
City or the public. We cannot concur with that contention. Arnold's 
Addition was platted and laid out as an addition to Boise City, and 
lots and blocks were sold therein with reference to such plat, and the 
act of the legislature extending the corporate limits of Boise City so as 
to include said addition was clearly an implied acceptance thereof by 
the city. However, regardless of that fact, we think the dedication was 
complete when Arnold platted said land and filed a plat for record 
and sold lots with reference to said plat. 
Id. 14 Idaho at 277. (Emphasis added). 
[6) 
Thus, under Boise City v. Hon, there are two situations where acceptance is 
implied: (1) where there is a sale of platted lots in reference to the plat; and (2) where the 
subdivision is annexed. 
The next case cited by the Highway District is Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 
Idaho 505, 144 P. 548 (1914). Paddison already discussed Thiessen in its Opening Brief 
and incorporates the same points here. Acceptance on the part of the City was shown in 
Thiessen by the fact that the property had been annexed by the city of Lewiston; that it 
was a street that extended from Main Street; that it was continuously, openly and 
uninterruptedly traveled by the public as a highway for ten years prior to 1893; that most 
of it was enclosed by a fence, telephone lines had been installed on it; and that since 
annexation, the City maintained part of the street. Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho 
505,510, 144 P. 548, 549 (1914). 
Moreover, in Thiessen, there was no question that the city of Lewiston had 
accepted jurisdiction over the road, was regularly maintaining a portion of the road, and 
was not disclaiming an interest in the road as is the case here. Thiessen is not a precedent 
for this case. 
The next case cited by the Highway District is Smylie v. Pearsall, 93 Idaho 188, 
457 P.2d 427 (1969). Like Boise City v. Hon, Smylie involved the platting of a 
subdivision and the sale of lots with respect thereto, a factual distinction not applicable in 
this case. 
It is a settled principle that when a map or plat of a subdivided tract of 
land is exhibited or recorded and conveyances are made of the lots by 
reference thereto, the plat becomes a part of the deeds, and the plan shown 
thereon is regarded as a unity. And, nothing else appearing, it is held that 
all the streets, alleys, parks or other open spaces delineated on such map or 
plat have been dedicated to the use of the purchasers of the lots and those 
[7] 
claiming under them as well as of the public. They become appurtenances 
to the lots. It is presumed that all such places add value to all the lots 
embraced in the general plan and that the purchasers invest their money 
upon the faith of this assurance that such open spaces, particularly access 
ways, are not to be the private property of the seller. 
Id. 93 Idaho at 192. 
The Highway District also tries to argue that Pugmire v. Johnson, 102 Idaho 882, 
643 P.2d 832 (1982), supports its case. However, Pugmire does not stand for the 
proposition asserted by the Highway District. Pugmire involved the sale of lots under a 
plat that had roads depicted on it and maintenance of at least some of the roads on the plat 
by Bannock County for nine years. The maintenance included grading, weed control, 
gravel surfacing, snow removal, plowing and sanding when necessary throughout the 
year. The County also provided stop signs and street signs and the roads were open for 
public use. Id. 102 Idaho at 882. The Court held that under the statutory provisions in 
effect. the recording of the plat and maintenance of the roads by the County rendered the 
roads public. Id. In addition, due to the sale of the platted lots, the Court found a 
dedication. Finally, the Court held that once the County undertook jurisdiction, it could 
not deny responsibility for such roads. Id. 
The Highway District argues that the Pugmire Court's citation to Thiessen 
supports it argument that simply public use alone can constitute acceptance of a 
dedication. However, the Pugmire Court cited Thiessen as authority for these statements 
by the Court: 
The record clearly shows that at least some of the roads in question have 
been used by the public for longer than five years and maintained at public 
expense by the county from 1969 to 1978, a period of nine years. 
Bannock County's regular maintenance and the extensive public use 
disclosed in the record are sufficient to establish that roads which have 
[8] 
been so maintained and so used are county roads under LC. § § 40-103 and 
-109. 
Pugmire v. Johnson, 102 Idaho at 884. Thiessen did involve long public use and 
maintenance by the City of Lewiston. This citation is consistent with other citations to 
Thiessen. For example, in John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 129 Idaho 740, 
932 P.2d 368 (Ct.App. 1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals cited Thiessen as authority for 
the statement that "the terms 'establish' and 'dedicate' have both been used in Idaho case 
law to describe the creation of a public roadway through public use and maintenance." 
Id. 129 Idaho at 744. 
The next case the Highway District attempts to rely on is Pullin v. Victor, 103 
Idaho 879, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct.App. 1982). Pullin does not help the Highway District's 
argument because the Court specifically reaffirmed the principle that "from the proof of 
the sale between the parties, it may be inferred that the lots in Burrington' s Subdivision 
were sold in reference to the plat of the subdivision. Such an inference could result in a 
finding that the dedication of Birch Street had been accepted." Id. 103 Idaho at 882. 
The only proposition that Thiessen is cited for is that an offer to dedicate may be oral. 
Further, even where there was the sale of lots according to a plat, the Pullin Court 
went to lengths to explain the necessity of acceptance by positive conduct whether 
through maintenance or annexation or the assumption of jurisdiction over a road. The 
Court stated that "official acceptance of a dedication may consist of any positive conduct 
evincing consent of proper public officers on behalf of the public. [ citation omitted] An 
acceptance of a dedication of a street occurs when the city has done some act which 
unequivocally shows an intent to assume jurisdiction over the property dedicated." Id 
103 Idaho at 883. 
[9] 
The Pullin Court emphasized that the City had annexed the subdivision and 
repealed an ordinance which had vacated one of the streets in the subdivision, clearly 
showing an assumption of jurisdiction. The Court stated: 
There is further evidence relating to the acceptance of the dedication of 
Birch Street in the record before us. It is undisputed that the City of 
Kimberly annexed Burrington's Subdivision in 1949, well before the 
parties here entered into their transaction. The affidavit of Donald Taylor, 
a former chairman of the Kimberly City Council, stated that in May, 1973, 
the City Council formally repealed an ordinance which had vacated a 
portion of Birch Street lying north of Lot 6 of Burrington's Subdivision. 
That ordinance is not in the record. However, it can be inferred that the 
city had accepted Birch Street as a public road either by the 
annexation ordinance or by some other act, between 1949 and 1973; 
otherwise, the city would have had no reason later to vacate part of 
the street by ordinance. This inference gives rise to the further inference 
that Birch Street may have been accepted as a public road as of 1961, 
when Lot 6 was sold to the buyers herein. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
The Highway District next relies on Worley Highway Dist. v Yacht Club of Coeur 
d'Alene. Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 111 (1989). However, Worley also involved the 
platting and sale of lots with respect to the plat. Finding that a statutory dedication failed, 
the Court reaffirmed the rule that "an offer to dedicate is accepted when lots are 
purchased with reference to a filed plat." Id. 116 Idaho at 224. 
Moreover, in contrast to the case at hand, in Worley, the Worley Highway District 
claimed jurisdiction over the road and sought to quiet title in it. It was not a case, like 
this one, where the Highway District and County are disclaiming jurisdiction. 
The Highway District misrepresents the facts of Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs, 
Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002). First, the case expressly involved the 
sale of lots in reference to a plat. The Court stated: "In this case the fact that a plat was 
validly filed and patents sold referencing the plat and the road constitutes common law 
[10] 
dedication." Id. 138 Idaho at 385. As already shown, no such platting and sale of lots 
occurred in this case. 
Second, though not relied on for the ruling on common law dedication, the facts 
show that in 1901, the Board of County Commissioners' resolved "that the dedication of 
same [Indian Creek Road] be and the same is hereby accepted, and it is hereby ordered 
that said above described road be added to and made a part of Road District No. 11 and 
said road with plat as presented be recorded as provided by law." Id. 138 Idaho at 383. 
Thus, long before the case at issue, Lemhi County had indicated an unequivocal intent to 
assume jurisdiction over the road. 
By the time of the case at issue, however, Lemhi County disavowed jurisdiction 
and would not perform maintenance on it. Due to the fact that the common law 
dedication was completed through sale of lots in reference to the plat, the Court would 
not release Lemhi County from its responsibility for the road, ruling that the road could 
only be abandoned or vacated through the formal statutory process. 
The last case cited by the Highway District is Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 
497, 236 P.3d 1257 (2010). The Highway District mostly goes to lengths to distinguish 
the case rather than rely on it presumably because of the following statement by the 
Court: 
The County also argues that a woman named Mrs. Stover orally dedicated 
the road sometime between 1942 and 1974 when she owned the tract that 
later became the Reico Subdivision. The County relies on an affidavit 
from an area resident claiming that Mrs. Stover told the affiant she 
intended for the road to remain open to the public. The County, however, 
admitted that there is no evidence in the record that it had accepted 
any dedication by Mrs. Stover. Even if there had been an acceptance, 
this paraphrased statement attributed to an absent witness does not 
unequivocally create a public dedication. There is no evidence that Mrs. 
Stover stated her present intent to dedicate the road to the County, but 
[ l l] 
rather that she simply intended to allow the public to continue using the 
road for recreation. Her statement, therefore, would not generate a genuine 
fact issue as to dedication." 
Id. 149 Idaho at 502. (Footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
The Court made the statement that there was no acceptance of the purported 
dedication by Adams County even in the face of extensive public use of the road. Thus, 
the Court denied Adams County's argument for common law dedication by Mrs. Stover 
on alternative bases, one of which was that Adams County had not accepted her offer to 
dedicate. This confirms the requirement that there be some positive action by a county or 
highway district accepting a common law dedication. 
In Lattin. the Court ultimately held that the road became public by prescription, a 
claim that the Highway District cannot prove in this case and has dropped. 
Finally, even in a case where the federal government has offered to dedicate land 
for highway purposes, the Idaho courts have held that such offer must be properly 
accepted, either by public use and maintenance sufficient to establish a road by 
prescription or "there must be some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public 
authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to the 
particular highway in question." French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 957, 751 P.2d 98, 
105 (1988), at fn. 4, (citing Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 282-3, 119 P.2d 266, 268 
(1941) and Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790, 605 P.2d 968 (1980). Surely, 
if these requirements must be shown for the acceptance of a federal offer to dedicate, 
nothing less should be required of the dedication by a private party. 
In this case, Paddison's Opening Brief shows that the facts m this case are 
insufficient to show a road by prescription. This is confirmed by the Highway District's 
[ 12] 
relinquishment of that claim. Further, there has been no "positive act or acts on the part 
of the proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with 
respect to the particular highway in question." 
In sum, though the Highway District and the County argue that Paddison is 
arguing that common law dedication no longer exists, Paddison has not made this claim. 
\Vhat Paddison does assert is that to prove a common law dedication in Idaho, the cases 
require either the sale of lots in reference to a plat, or proof that the dedication was 
accepted by positive conduct of proper public officers on behalf of the public or some act 
which unequivocally shows intent to assume jurisdiction over the road. This can be 
shown by various acts on the part of proper public officials, including annexation, the 
assumption of jurisdiction over and responsibility for the road, maintenance of the road, 
or resolution. However, where there is no such sale of platted lots and where there is no 
positive conduct or intent to assume jurisdiction, and, instead, there is an express 
disavowal of any interest in the road, there is no acceptance. 
C. THE IDAHO STATUTES PRECLUDE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY FROM 
BEING A PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
1. The Highway District's and County's position that the right-of-way is a 
public right-of-way under the laws of the state of Idaho is inconsistent 
with its failure to assume jurisdiction over or assert an interest in the 
right-of-way. 
LC.§ 40-1310 sets out the authority of the highway district.3 Subsection (8) and 
(9) state: 
(8) The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive 
general supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and 
public rights-of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish 
design standards, establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish 
3 The statutes relating to county authority are virtually identical. 
[ 13] 
regulations in accordance with the provisions of title 49, Idaho Code, and 
control access to said public highways, public streets and public rights-of-
way. 
(9) By July 1, 2000, and every five (5) years thereafter, the highway 
district board of commissioners shall have published in map form and 
made readily available the location of all public rights-of-way under its 
jurisdiction. Any highway district board of commissioners may be granted 
an extension of time with the approval of the legislature by adoption of a 
concurrent resolution. 
If the right-of-way here were in fact a public road under the laws of the state of 
Idaho, the Highway District (or the County) would be required to assume jurisdiction 
over it, regulate it, and include it as a public right-of-way on its map. Neither the County 
nor the Highway District did any of this and instead specifically disavow responsibility 
for or jurisdiction over the road. 
Both the Highway District and County rely on l.C. § 40-202 for the argument that 
they do not have to maintain a public right-of-way for it to be a public right-of-way. 
Paddison does not dispute the proposition that upon a dedication, a county or highway 
district is not required to immediately begin maintaining the road. However, the County 
and the Highway District carefully avoid mentioning the entire statute because a full 
reading of the statute refutes their argument that no action on the part of public officials is 
required for acceptance of a dedication and mere use alone can constitute acceptance. 
Consistent with LC. § 40-1310(8) and (9) set out above, LC. § 40-202(2) requires 
that on a dedication, a county or highway district must take some action, even if by 
simple resolution, to assume jurisdiction over the road. It provides: 
(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real property for 
highway or public right-of-way purposes, the respective commissioners 
shall: 
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(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or other document 
establishing an interest in the property for their highway system purposes 
to be recorded in the county records; or 
(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway district system to be 
amended as affected by the acceptance of the highway or public right-of-
way. 
Provided, however, a county with highway jurisdiction or highway district 
may hold title to an interest in real property for public right-of-way 
purposes without incurring an obligation to construct or maintain a 
highway within the right-of-way until the county or highway district 
determines that the necessities of public travel justify opening a highway 
within the right-of-way. The lack of an opening shall not constitute an 
abandonment, and mere use by the public shall not constitute an opening 
of the public right-of-way. 
Here, the Highway District and the County have specifically disavowed an 
interest in or jurisdiction over the right-of-way; neither has resolved to include the right-
of-way in its highway system; and neither includes it on its official map. If anything, this 
section confirms that either the County of Highway District must take some sort of 
positive action to accept a dedication of a road for it to be a public road under the laws of 
the state of Idaho. 
2. The right-of-way here is excluded from qualifying as a public road 
because it is under federal control. 
In Pugmire v. Johnson, 102 Idaho 882, 643 P.2d 832 (1982), the Court held that 
where public use and maintenance results in a road being a "public highway," it is part of 
the ··county road system" or "highway district system" as the case may be. Id. 102 Idaho 
at 884. Yet, the statutory definitions for a "highway district system" and a "county 
highway system" exclude public highways under federal control. Idaho Code § 40-
109(1) excludes public highways under federal control from the Highway District System 
and LC. § 40-104(6) excludes public highways under federal control from the County 
Highway System. 
[ 15] 
Likewise, in French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 751 P.2d 98 (1988), Custer 
County attempted to argue, based on an earlier Idaho case, that a road under the control 
of the Forest Service and in which the Forest Service had an easement was a public road 
under the laws of the state of Idaho. In distinguishing the case and rejecting the argument 
the Supreme Court quoted from and upheld the opinion of the district court which stated: 
The road in Nesbitt was not a road under control of the Forest Service as 
in the case at bar. There was no need for the majority to address, as did 
Justice Smith in dissent, J.C.§ 40-109(b). The genesis ofl.C. § 40-109(b) 
was Session Laws 1951, ch. 93, sec. 4,p. 165. The chapter extensively 
created a highway and road system for state, county, municipal and road 
districts. Then LC. 40-109(b) stated: 
·'A 'county road system' shall comprise all public highways in a county 
except those included within highway system, those included within 
municipal street systems of incorporated cities and villages, and those 
underfederal control." 
The present statute is substantially the same, LC. 40-104(6). "The court is 
of the opinion the foregoing statutes disclose that counties have no duties 
relative to Forest Service roads, nor rights to declare them county roads 
under J.C. 40-202." 
Therefore. a public highway cannot be established by public use if it is under 
federal control. Otherwise, by accepting the Highway District's arguments, there would 
exist in the State of Idaho a "public" roadway where no particular political subdivision 
claims jurisdiction. 
As already mentioned, the District has admitted that the Coolwater Ridge Road, 
including the right-of-way, is claimed by the federal government. Therefore, being 
under purported federal control, the right-of-way cannot qualify as a public highway 
through public use. 
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D. THE HIGHWAY DISTRICT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SEL\VAY 
RIVER ROAD; ITS STATUS HAS NEVER BEEN AT ISSUE IN THIS 
CASE; AND PADDISION HAS ALWAYS AGREED THAT IT IS A 
PUBLIC ROAD UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
As for the general statements by the Highway District and County in their Briefs 
as to the Selway River Road, Paddison has made it crystal clear: Paddison does not 
challenge the status of the Selway River Road as a public road under the laws of the state 
of Idaho. It is not and has never been a part of this case. 
Contrary to the right-of-way in this case, the Highway District does accept and 
exercise jurisdiction over the Selway River Road. Paddison's Complaint raises no issues 
with respect to the Selway River Road nor even mentions it. Paddison has not challenged 
the jurisdiction of the Highway District over the Selway River Road and Paddison has 
always agreed that the Selway River Road is a public road under the laws of the state of 
Idaho. In fact, it was the Paddison family that granted an easement to the public for use 
of the Selway Road to cross their property. (R., 130). 
The fact that the Highway District and County continue to even brings this issue 
up 1s nothing more than an attempt to continue stoking fear that somehow this case 
implicates that road. The Highway District and County's repeated reference to this issue 
is made solely to inflame passions and such tactic should not be condoned by the Court. 
E. NEITHER THE HIGHWAY DISTRICT NOR COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES OR COSTS. 
The County did not seek attorney's fees in its brief and, therefore, is foreclosed 
from claiming attorney's fees and costs. I.AR. 40 and 41. 
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The Highway District seeks attorney's fees and costs under LC. § 12-117 and 
I.A.R. 40 and 41. The Highway District is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs because 
this case was not pursed unreasonably or without a foundation. 
The issue in this case is whether a common law dedication can be accepted by 
mere public use, without a public agency expressly accepting the dedication. There are 
no cases that support the proposition that mere public use alone constitutes acceptance of 
a dedication. The recent case law on dedication clearly states that there must be an 
acceptance of the dedication by the relevant public agency. See e.g., Pullin v. Victor, 103 
Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86. 88 (Ct.App. 1982.) "Generally, official acceptance of a 
dedication may consist of any positive conduct evincing consent of proper public officers 
on behalf of the public." Id. 
In addition, cases involving issues of first impression should not appropriate for 
an award of fees under LC. § Section 12-117. See e.g., PurCo. Fleet Services v. Idaho 
State Dept. of Finance, l...J.0 Idaho 121, 90 P.3d 346 (2004); Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 
144 Idaho 119,157 P.3d 613 (2007). 
In this case, it cannot be said that this case was brought unreasonably and without 
foundation. Alternatively, even if the Court rules in favor of Defendants, it would be one 
of first impression about whether mere public use, without official acceptance by a state 
public agency, can create a public road under a common law dedication theory. 




For all of the reasons set fot1h in Paddison's Opening Brief and those set forth 
above, Paddison requests summary judgment that the dedication of the right-of-way "to 
the general public for all road and highway purposes provided for in the laws of the State 
of Idaho" was not complete and that the right-of-way identified in the deeds is not a 
public road and/or highway established or provided for under the laws of the State of 
Idaho. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 2011. 
HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, P.L.L.C. 
/ I 
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By .. L~__:::._::·:_',~~\··~· . .....f./~.:= 1· ~-~~-.. V ' k:-,. --,_ 
Fritz X. Haernrnerle 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the h__ day of May, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attomey(s) named below in the 
manner noted: 
Kirk A. MacGregor 
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. 463 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
David E. Wynkoop 
730 N. Main St. 
P.O. Box 31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
X By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s) at his 
offices in Hailey, Idaho. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number 
________ , and by then mailing copies of the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
PRITZ X. HAEMMERLE ~-------
[20] 
